Marcella Jensen Tuttle and Richard Dale Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express and Heath H. Cornette : Reply Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Marcella Jensen Tuttle and Richard Dale Tuttle v.
Pacific Intermountain Express and Heath H.
Cornette : Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson; E. F. Baldwin, Jr.; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express, No. 7619 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1381
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELLA JENSEN TUTTLE 
and RICHARD DALE TUTTLE, 
a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, 
Marcella Jensen Tuttle, 
Pla.intiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EX-
PRESS, a corporation, and 
HEATH H. CORNETTE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
F I J ~~ 2 -~-~ xC~' 
Case No. 
7619 
t. - , ~ , __ __ , STEWART, CANNON & HANSON, 
.t-\:r _  -; ~ ,~ l:J~! E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
----·~--c·,- ~-- ;· - -::~- --_ ---- r-:----~-" · ·.~ ~~-- : . ,-~ -1lltorneys for Defendants 
· ...tenc \ ,:,upt eme 'L,01~: l' '1 !.._, .. :• .. ~ and Appellants. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. 
SUBJECT INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
----------------------------------------------------------
Suppositions do not Dispel Proven Facts ........................... . 
No Northbound Car was Involved in the Accident ___________ _ 
1 
2 
4 
Plaintiffs' Map, Exhibits "FF" and "GG"------------------------3, 4 
Witnesses' Testimony is no Stronger Than Qualified 
or Limited on Cross-Examination__________________________________ 7 
Negative Character of Plaintiffs' Evidence and Re-
moteness from the Scene of Accident____________________________ 7 
Elmer M. Roberts _______________________ -----------------------------__ 8 
Douglas A. Payne ___________________ ----------------------------------- 8 
Dellis Elliott -------------------------------------- ____ ------------------ 9 
Gordon Elliott ---------------------------------------- ______________ 9, 10 
Hearsay Should be Disregarded as Incomt>etent Evi-
dence ----------- ___ . ___________ . ____ -----·- --.- ________ . ___ ------------ ___ ....... ___ 12 
Dispute as to Beardall Car---------------------------------------------------- 13 
Physical Facts ----------.---------------------------- ------------·--·- _ --------·-··· 17 
Respondents' Authorities --------·····--------------------------------------- 2 3 
Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict Should 
have been Sustained--------··-·····--················-····--········--·-··· 2 5 
II. ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS ····---····- .26 
Jury Did not Determine Tuttle Car was Travelling North 28 
Defendants' Theory of the Evidence was Denied................ 3 0 
Procedure of Plaintiff was Calculated to Prejudice .... 32, 33 
Palpable Error in the Court's Instructions Requested 
by Plain tiff Were Calculated to Prejudice.................... 3 5 
The Court's Instruction No. 15--------------------35, 36, 37 
The Court's Instruction No. 14-----------------·····--·------- 3 7 
The Court's Instruction No. 13----------------------------···· 3 8 
No. 1, Submitting all Unsupported Allegations ...... 39 
Lights Were Not a Proximate Cause.·----------------------·····-····-· 40 
Undue Emphasis on Presumptions and Inferences ........ 40, 41 
Insurance Indemnification ------------------------------------------·······- 4 2 
III. CONCLUSION ···-····-···--·-··-··-·······---·····---·······-·-·--·····-·····--·------- 43 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: Page 
Anderson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 76 Utah 324, 289 p 146 ________ 26 
Boutelle v. White (Ga.), 149 S.E. 8 0 5----------------------·--------------------- 3 6 
Cederlof v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P(2) 777·---------------·----------- 27 
Clark v. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P 582 ____ 33 
Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co., 111 Utah 541 180 
p ( 2) 54 2 ------------------------··----····--·------------------------------:____________ 2 5 
Dudley v. Surles (La.), 11 So. 2nd 7 0 ---------------------------- 7 ~-------------- 2 7 
East Grouse Creek Water Co. v. Frost, 66 Utah 587, 245 P 338 .. 26 
Edwards v. Clark, et al, 96 Utah 121, 83 P(2) 1021..__________________ 7 
Fry v. Smith (Iowa) 2 53 N. W. 14 7------------------------------------------------ 3 6 
Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 101, 48 P(2) 449 ________ 25 
Giles v. Voiles (Ga.), 88 S.E. 201---------------------------··----------------------- 36 
Grandhagen v. Grandhagen (Wis.), 255 N.W. 935------------------------ 37 
Gregory v. Suhr (Iowa), 268 N.W. 14-------------------------------------------- 36 
Hearstrich v. Oregon Short Lines R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 
2 6 2 p 1 0 0-----------------------------------------------··-· -------. -·- --·-·------------ --- 2 5 
In Re Newells Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P(2) 230---------------------------- 41 
Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522, 88 P(2) 459·------·------------------ 25 
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P 349 ________________ 32 
Knutson v. Luri (Iowa), 251 N.W. 147 -------------·----·--------------------- 35 
Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah 351, 113 P 77---------------------------------- 25 
Lither bury v. Kimmet (Cal), 19 5 P 6 6 0---------------------------------------- 2 7 
Loony v. Parker (Iowa), 230 N.W. 570------------------------------------------ 36 
Madron v. McCoy, et al (Idaho) 126 P(2) 566---------------------------- 27 
Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P(2) 127 .... -------------------- 38 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P(2) 772---------------------------- 31 
Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P 405 ____________ 24, 41 
Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 P 153 ... --------------------------------- 7 
Probst v. Smith Hardware Co. (La.), 141 So. 508------------------------ 27 
Putnam v. Industrial Commission, et al, 80 Utah 187, 14 
p ( 2) 9 7 3 -------------------------"·------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Saltas v. Affleck, 9 9 Utah 3 81, 10 5 P ( 2) 17 6 .................... 3 7, 3 8, 41 
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 2 6 2, 17 0 P 7 2---------------------------------------- 38 
State v. Green, 7 8 Utah 58 0, 6 P ( 2) 17 7 --------------------------------·------- 3 8 
Verrill v. Harrington (Me.), 16 3 Atl. 2 6 6-------------------------------------- 27 
Young v. Cerrato (Cal.), 3 7 P ( 2) 10 6 3~--------------------------------------- 2 7 
STATUTE - UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, SECTIONS: " 
57-7-113 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELL.._c\_ JENSEN TUTTLE 
and RICHARD DALE TUTTLE, 
a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, 
Marcella Jensen Tuttle, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EX-
PRESS, a corporation, and 
HEATH H. CORNETTE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I 
Case No. 
7619 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When there are eye-witnesses to an accident, includ-
ing disinterested witnesses who actually saw how the 
accident occurred, there is no reason to guess or assume 
that one of the vehicles (in this instance the Tuttle 
car) was going in the opposite direction to which it 
was actually travelling at the very time of the accident. 
There is no question in this case·but what the McPhies, 
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being close to the scene of the accident and W'alking in 
the same direction as the Tuttle car was travelling, 
saw how it occurred. Their testimony is corroborated 
by the physical facts and other witnesses, namely, 
Stevenson, Cornette, and we might add Carol Ellis as 
evidenced on her cross examination. 
Much of what we could say here is set forth in our 
original brief, including specific excerpts from the evi-
dence. Counsel for respondents has, however, indulged 
in numerous statements and conclusions which appear 
more calculated to confuse and distort the actual facts 
than enlighten the court. Much is directed to sympathy 
and collateral matters. 
It is without dispute, and counsel for respondents 
agrees, that ALL WITNESSES WHO ACTUALLY 
SAW AND WITNESSED THE COLLISION (and 
they were in the immediate vicinity) testified that the 
Tuttle car, travelling near the west edge of the high-
way, suddenly turned as though making a U turn im-
mediately in front of defendants' truck. That was the 
actual cause of the collision. 
NOTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS OF COUNSEL 
D~O NOT DISPEL THESE VISIBLE FACTS. Such 
would be to accept speculation as against the clear and 
undisputed testimony of ALL WITNESSES who ac-
tually saw the accident occur. THERE IS NO REASON 
TO SPECULATE WHEN DISINTERESTED WIT-
NESSES OBSERVED WHAT HAPPENED·. AC-
TUAL PROBATIVE FACTS SHOULD BE DISTIN-
GUISHED FROM SPECULATION AND BARE HY-
POTHESES. 
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'Y"ithout unnecessarily duplicating the matter 
stated in our original brief, but to illustrate the far-
fetched notions and suppositions of counsel, we would 
like to call attention to the location of the various wit-
nesses 'Yi th relation to the place of the actual collision, 
and the various distances involved. It is frequently help-
ful in nsualizing general locations to refer to the maps 
and drawings. 
In our original brief, we inserted a photostatic copy 
of the large map, plaintiffs' Exhibition "GG". Perhaps 
here "~e should make the observation that in order to 
get the· exhibit in the brief, it is of necessity smaller 
than the original, about one-fourth in size. It also ap-
pears the photographer was unable to get in the extreme 
ends of the map. So, in measuring and calculating ac-
tual distances, such measurement should be taken from 
the original, unless the substantially reduced size is 
taken into account. 
The full details of Exhibit '' FF' ', the small~r rna p, 
although substantially duplicated on the top of Ex-
hibit "GG", prepared by plaintiff, was drawn to a 
very small ~cale ; one inch equals 100 feet. Being 41 
inches in length, it represents the total distance along 
the actual highway of 4100 feet, practically a mile 
(5,280 feet). The scale is so small that .the actual four 
paved traffic lanes are not shown, the two outside lines 
being an inch in width, representing the entire right 
of way to the fence lines, or 100 feet in actual width on 
the ground. ( T. 13) 
It should further be observed as to Exhibit "FF" 
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that there is a small oblong area in the approximate 
center of the map indicated by heavy dotted lines and 
which measures on the exhibit 4x2 inches. It is within 
this small area that the collision occurred. Such area 
is shown in greater detail on the larger map shown on 
the bottom of Exhibit '' GG' ', the paved lanes of traffic 
being there shown. The larger map is drawn to the 
scale of one inch equals six feet, nearly 17 times larger 
than the small map; the large one represents an over-all 
distance of 400 or 410 feet on the actual highway or 
ground. This larger scaled map is simply an enlarge-
ment of the small 4x2 inches area indicated on the 
small map '(Exhibit "FF"), and the McPhie residence 
is located within such area. (See plaintiffs' original 
Exhibit '' FF '') The brass monument shown on Exhibit 
'' FF'' is not the brass monument where the collision 
occurred. There was another brass monument near the 
collision, shown only on the enlarged map (bottom of 
Exhibit "GG"). 
NO NORTHBOUND CAR \VAS INVOLVED IN 
THE ACCID·ENT 
When one considers the extreme ends to which 
counsel went in his efforts to prove that the Tuttle 
car was travelling north, the use of such a small scaled 
map, Exhibit "FF ", is self-evident. Respondents' 
claims are based solely upon the notion advanced that 
the Tuttle car was going north. YET NO ONE SAW 
A N~ORTHBOUND CAR AT OR NEAR THE IMME-
DIATE VICINITY OF THE COLLISION NOR ANY 
SUCH CAR ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN THE COL-
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LISIOX. Respondents' suppositions are based upon 
the isolated statement of one witness, namely Ernest 
L. Holt, that he sa\Y HEADLIGHTS of a northbound 
Yehicle ABOUT THE CENTER OF THE COUNTY 
I~FIR~LA.RY HILL. Holt was riding in a car with 
Clifford Beardall, a close friend of deceased and de-
ceased's family ... A.s to his actual observations, we quote 
his testimony : 
'' Q. I see. N O"\V were there any cars, or did 
you notice any cars southward, or northward 
bound to,vard Provo~ 
''A. There was one car coming towards 
Provo. 
"Q. Where was that~ A. It was - oh, I'd 
say about halfway down the Infirmary Hill. 
"Q. And do you know, when you made that 
observation whether it was before or after the 
truck passed~ A. Before the truck passed.'' 
(T-136) 
With respect to when the truck passed, he testified 
on cross-examination : 
''Q. I think you told us that this truck passed 
you just a little south of Lou's Place~ A. I 
said in the vicinity of Lou's Place. 
'' Q. Well, I think you did. Were you north 
or south of Lou's Place. A. I WOULDN'T BE 
SURE." (T-140) 
And, indeed, he wasn't and couldn't be sure. 
Referring back to the map, plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"FF" (or see the upper portion of plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"GG") and measuring the scale, we observe it is 1162 
'5 
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feet from Lou's Place to the approximate point of col-
lision and another 18 or 19 inches on the map, or 1800 
to 1900 feet, to the approximate middle of the Infirmary 
'Hill. Totalling these distances, there was not less than 
2900 to 3000 feet (over one-half mile) that even the 
headlights of any northbound car was claimed to have 
been seen or observed. With many· cars on the well-
travelled highway at night, it is only likely, (perhaps 
more likely than not), that someone within nearly a 
mile 's· distance would claim to have· seen northbound 
lights of some vehicle at some remote point. Being at 
night, it .couldn't really be known (if lights were seen 
and no other witness saw any) whether it was the Tuttle 
vehicle or even if it was a passenger car. Certainly, 
it seems the height of speculation to assume that such 
car was involved in the accident when there is no evi-
dence that this or :any northbound car was in the vicinity 
of the collision. MR. HOLT DID NOT SEE THE 
LIGHTS THEREAFTER, and it is just as likely that 
the lights observed belonged to the automobile that was 
1 
seen by Mrs. McPhie after the . accident which came 
from th·e south towards the north and stopped just south 
of defendants' truck. (T-332, 337) She said, "It was 
stopping at that time, :about the time that we arrived 
there, the car from the south driving north''. (T-337) 
We might add another observation concerning ac-
tual distances. Holt did not know how far north of 
Lou's Place he was when he claimed to have seen the 
headlights on the Infirmary Hill. The truck would 
necessarily have had to have passed him, Holt, a sub-
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stantial distanee north of Lou '8 or, otherwise, such 
headlights "\Yould haYe had to haYe travelled substan-
tially in exces~ of 50 m.p.h. to have met the truck at 
the ~IcPhie 's residenee, the place of collision. 
It is a 'Yell established la'v that a WITNESS' 
TESTI~IONY ON DIRECT EXAJ\1INATION IS NIO 
STROXGER TH.A_X _A_S nlODIFIED 0R LIMITED 
BY HIS FURTI-IER EX.A_niiNATION OR BY HIS 
CROSS EX ... \~IIXATION. 
Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 P 153. 
Edwards v. Cla.rk, et al, 96 Utah 121, 83 
P(2) 1021. 
Putnanz v. Industrial Commission, et al, 80 
Utah 187, 14 P(2) 973. 
While ''""e may be necessarily repeating some of our 
summary of the evidence given in our original brief, 
\Ye wish to further point out the remote and specula-
tive nature of the conclusions of counsel for respond-
ents vievved in the light of this well-established rule. 
The negative character of the testimony of the wit-
nesses Charles M. Roberts, Douglas A. Payne, Jean 
Elliott and Dellis and Gordon Elliott, her two boys, 
was brought out at page 34 of our original brief. In 
view of counsel's insistance, however, we would like to 
quote further from the actual re~ord. Counsel for re-
spondents, through these friendly witnesses and lead-
ing and suggestive questions, elicited general statements, 
estimates if the court please, to the effect that the truck 
as it passed was travelling approximately 50 m.p.h., 
and in passing, may have passed approximately near 
,... 
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tltP eenter of the highway. THEY ALL ADMITTED 
TilEY DID NOrr SEE THE COLLISION AND ALL 
OF THEM WERE SUBSTANTIALLY OVER ONE-
FOURTI-I OF A MILE OR MORE FROM THE 
SCENE. 
Perhap~ it should he mentioned that the Charles 
M. Roberts here was not the Elmer M. Roberts walk-
ing with the McPhjc~s near the accident. He was trav-
elling in a ear about 20 rn.p.h. (T-26) three-fourths of 
a mile north of the accident. ( T -25) He did not see the 
accident a no I a ter. a~ to 'vhen he arrived at the scene, 
l1e ~Hi(]. · · \\'h.--.n T >;"'•1 ~~ut tlJPI'P tllP tundit.ion wa:-: tht=>rt>: 
TH~~T·~ AI.!. -1 K~U\V ABOliT TFLA_T'~. (T-26) 
Douglas A Payne -vvas delivering papers for the 
Deseret News about a block and a half north of Lou's 
Place (or approximately three Salt Lake City blocks 
from the scene of the collision). No claim was made 
that he saw the accident. We quote: 
"Q. How long did you observe that truck~ 
The P.I.E. outfit. A. I couldn't see it after it 
got up the road about a block and a half or two 
blocks. I DIDN'T SEE IT AFTER THAT." 
(T-35) 
The Elliotts lived on the west side of the highway 
about 1700 or 1800 feet north of the accident. The two 
boys were on their \\lay to Springville and had gotten 
out on the west edge of the highway. Their mother, 
Jean Elliott, was produced by plaintiff as a witness. 
She had been concerned about the boys and came out on 
her front porth and saw the truck pass. She did not 
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rlain1 to haYe seen the accident. ( T -53-55) 
As to the t\YO Elliott boys, Dellis explained that 
they \Yere bet,Yeen their home and the Petrofesa 's resi-
dence. This \\"as over 1500 feet, or subst:antially over 
one-fourth of a mile, fron1 the place of accident. (An 
X and the initials G.E. \Yere placed on the upper part 
of Exhibit "GG" to illustrate their general location). 
Dellis testified they 'vere going to Springville to attend 
a dance. He observed the truck passed, and testified 
further: 
'' Q. How many cars had gone past go-
ing south ":bile you were there~ A. Going south? 
'' Q. Yes. Going toward Springville. A. 
Well, I dont know. 
"Q. Would you have any estimate~ A. 
Why, I wasn't counting the cars. We was look-
ing for a ride. But in ten minutes how many 
cars can go by on a main highway 1 
'' Q. I'm just asking you. A. I don't know. 
(T-50) 
"Q. Did you observe the truck after it 
passed you? A. UNTIL IT GOT TO ABOUT 
LOU'S. THAT'S ALL." (T-45) 
While counsel for respondents through leading and 
suggestive questions attempted to elicit from Gordon 
Elliott, the other boy, that he observed no cars ahead 
of the one the truck was passing, it is evident that this 
immature boy did not know with any degree of certainty 
what cars were southbound ahead of the truck :and had 
no actual knowledge as to the cause of the accident. 
He said, "Well, we were hitchhiking over to Springville, 
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we vvas going· to a BASKETBALL GAME, and this 
truck passed me. I turned my back to it to keep the 
wind and snow out of my face, ~and it went up the road 
and I heard a crash, a big flash of lightning and crash-
ing, and me and my brother went up there." (T-57) 
By the next question and in :an effort to lead this 
immature witness, the following question and answer 
are significant : 
' ' Q. When it passed you was there any other 
car in the vicinity? A. It was passing a car. 
'' Q. . You say you turned away from the 
snow, as I understand. Which way did you turn? 
A. Sou.th .. ' ' ( T -57) 
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, HOWEVER, HE 
ACKNOWLEDGED TI-IAT BECAUSE OF TIIE 
. WIND AND SNOW FROM THE TRUCK, HE 
TURNED ~IS BACK TO THE TRUCK AS IT PRO-
CEEDED SOUTH. WE QUOTE: 
'' Q. You say, Gordon, when this truck went 
past you it caused a lot of wind . and snow to 
come whirling at you? A. Quite a bit. 
'' Q. And you sort of ducked your head to 
avoid that, did you? A. I turned my back to it. 
'' Q. YOU TURNED ·youR BACK TO IT, 
AND THE TRUCK PROCEEDED ON SOUTH 
(T-59); IS THAT RIGHT~ A. YES. (T-60) 
''Q. At the time you observed it, had the 
truck started to pass one or two cars~ A. ONE, 
AS I CAN REMEMBER." (T-60) 
As to the accident he testified : 
'' Q. Did you or did you not see the other 
10 
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car \Yith \Yhirh the rar collided before the ac-
eident occurred J? A. No, I didn't see it. 
~ · Q. And you didn't see the accident, or the 
actual iinpact between the truck and the car, 
did you 1 A. No." (T-66) 
That Gordon had no actual kno"Tledge of the cause 
of the accident is further self -evident from his state-
rnent admitted in eYidence and which was taken the day 
immediately following the accident, January 16, 1949, 
at a time \Yhen admittedly the matter was clearer in 
his mind than at the time of trial. (T-72) This state-
ment was taken in the presence of his father, Earl E. 
Elliott, and \Yas countersigned by the father, who 
vouched for the fact that the statement contained his 
sons version of the accident. It read: 
''Provo, Utah. January 16, 1949. My name is 
Gordon Elliott. I am thirteen years of age. I 
live With my folks on Highway 91 in the south 
end of Provo, Utah. On January 15, 1949, it was 
shortly before nine at night, it was dark, I was 
out in front of our home. I was out alongside 
the highway. A large truck went by while I was 
out on the highway. I watched the truck go south. 
It was in the center lane. It was passing some 
other cars. It had sounded its horn as it was 
passing these other cars. After the car got some 
distance south of our place I heard a. bang and 
I could see the truck was skiding. I did not see 
the other car until after I went up to the acci-
dent. I don't know just how the· accident oc-
curred. I .don't know which way this other car 
was traveling. I vvas the only one in my family 
that saw the truck. The rest of my folks were 
in the house. I have read the statement and it is 
11 
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correct." Signed "Gordon Elliott". And under-
neath, "The above is my son's version of the 
accident." Signed "Earl E. Elliott". (See Ex-
hibit "1" Prime) (T-77, 78) 
When the rule is applied, namely that a witness' 
testimony on direct examination is no stronger than as 
modified or limited by his further or cross ex~amination, 
the negative testimony of the foregoing witness, as well 
as that of Beardall, Holt and Carol Ellis, is insufficient 
to establish any facts in proof that the Tuttle car was 
travelling NORTH, or to establish or prove the acci-
dent occurred in any other manner than as proven by 
the eye witnesses. 
HEARSAY N,OT COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Counsel for respondent, page 8 of his brief, says 
"Mrs. Ellis testified that she first thought that the 
car that had been following was the car involved in the 
accident (Tr. 90), but changed her mind when she talked 
to Mr. Stevenson. (Tr. 107)" The only reason given by 
this witness was, therefore, based upon HEARSAY. 
Testimony, having as its SOLE BASIS hearsay is 
not probative evidence and when that element is elim-
inated from Miss Ellis' testimony AS IT SHOULD BE, 
her testimony being no stronger than shown on cross 
examination, in very fact corroborates the other eye 
witnesses. She clearly testified how the truck passed 
the car she was riding in with Stevenson immediately 
before the accident; that they were following another 
passenger car immediately ahead; that she had observed 
the tail lights of the passenger car immediately ahead; 
12 
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did not obserYe the impart but observed that the tail 
lights diS'a.ppeared immediately following the impact. 
She sa'Y no north bound cars in the immediate vicinity 
"·hatsoever. She "·as a'Yare of the fact that there were 
some pedestrians by the iinmediate side of the road 
(the ~IrPhies and Mr. Roberts). Referring to the time 
of the accident, she '""as asked and she answered the 
following questions: 
"Q. I see. And at that time you were under 
the assmnption that the car you were following 
had been involved in this accident with the truck, 
were you not~ A. That's right. 
''Q. And that was based upon the impres-
sion you received there that night~ A. That's 
correct." (T-96) 
Her statement given two days following the accident 
when she acknowledges ''the facts were fresh'' in her 
mind (T-99-100) further evidenced what she saw when 
the accident occurred. See p·ages 24-30 our original 
brief. 
DISPUTE AS TO BEARDALL CAR 
When it is considered that the electric wires did not 
come down instantly at the time of the collision and 
that the Stevenson-Ellis car parked on the west or right 
hand side of the road whereas Beardall, as he came up, 
arrived after the wires were down and went to the east 
side of the road where he flashed his lights on the 
wreck and immediately became engaged in the activities 
which he described, it is understandable that some dis-
pute might arise as to vvhich of the two cars, the Stev-
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enson's or Beardall's actually arrived first. 
Referring to the wires, Carol Ellis testified: 
''Mr. Stevenson was undecided as to whether 
to try to go underneath them or to back up, and 
we stopped. AND FINALLY LIGHTS WENT 
OUT AND WIRES CAME DOWN, and he was 
gone a few moments and came back and decided 
to move his car out of the highway so he pulled 
over into the snow bank and left me, :and I stayed 
in the car.'' 
''Q. Which snow bank was that~ A. On 
the right side of the road. * * * Well, there were 
people .over by the ca.r and standing around.'' 
Beardall did not, on the other hand, arrive until the 
wires were . down a few seconds after he heard the im-
pact. After. he brought his car to a stop, he immediately 
pulled directly over to the east side of the highway, cast-
ing his lights. on the two vehicles and immediately en-
gaged himself at the scene of the wreck. He testified: 
. _ ''A. Well, as the truck passed me it was only 
a few seconds or some time until we heard a colli-
sion, terrific impact and a light flash from the 
at the light up there.", and I said, "Yes, Look at 
the car across the road.'', and as I glanced at the 
car he said, ''Stop the car. The wires are in 
front of you.'', and as I pulled my car to a stop 
the wires was about eight inches from my car. 
_ "Q. All right. Was there any car at all in 
front of you~ A. I never seen a car in front 
of me, no sir. (T-113) 
'' Q. And what did you do then, Mr.· Beard-
all~ A. I IMMEDIATELY OPENED ~11 
LEFT-HAND DOOR AND LOOKED AROUND 
TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY TRAFFIC 
.14 
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FOLLOWING ME, AND TURNED MY CAR 
IN _..-\_ DIAGONAL POSITION ACROSS THE 
HIGHW.~A.Y AND ONTO THE EAST SIDE OF 
THE R~O.A.D AND PULLED MY LIGHTS UP 
UNTIL THEY HIT THE SCENE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
~ 'Q. vVhen you say you pulled your car to 
the east side of the road, how did you make that 
operation~ A. I turned my wheels to the right, 
this \Yay, (Indicating) and made a diagonal turn 
across the highway. 
'' Q. And how long after you came up to the 
wires did you do that, Mr. Beardall ~ A. Im-
mediately. 
"Q. Immediately~ A. Yes, sir. 
''Q. Then what did you do~ A. Then we-
I got out of the car and opened the trunk and 
took a large spotlight out of the car which I had in 
the car. (T-114) 
''Q. At that time was there anyone ;at the 
scene of the accident~ A. There was no one 
at the scene when I arrived there THAT I NO-
TICED." (T-115) 
At pages 32-33 of our original hrief, we quoted from 
the record, showing that neither Beardall nor Holt saw 
the accident. and their first intimation of the accident 
was when they saw the flashing of the wires. It is evi-
dent from the record just quoted above that in stopping, 
l\1r. Beardall IMMEDIATELY concerned himself with 
turning his car diagonally -across the highway and over 
to the scene of the wreckage on the east side. Under 
such circumstances, it is easy to see a possibility which 
prompted counsel for the respondents to raise an issue 
15 
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as to which car, Beardall's or Stevenson's, arTived at 
the scene of the accident first. However, a dispute as 
to that mater could not constitute any affirmative evi-
dence showing how the accident in fact occurred, and 
the fact that respondents rely entirely upon negative 
testimony is indicative that plaintiffs' entire case was 
based upon pure supposition. None 'of the witnesses 
whose testimony he relies upon saw the accident. They 
could not consistant with their oath testify contrary to 
the testimony of the disinterested eye witnesses and 
established physical facts. 
The McPhies had no possible interest in the case. 
They were standing right by where the accident oc-
~ured. Their testimony is corroborated by the physical 
facts, by the further sworn testimony of defendants' 
driver, Stevenson and by Carol Ellis as shown on cross 
examination. When there are disinterested eye wit-
nesess, there is no reason to assume the accident oC-
curred in some other manner found upon supposition 
and speculation. 
' ~- .... 16 •.j
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PI-IYSICAL FACTS 
The physical facts and eye-witnesses show that the 
impact and collision ·occurred on the west side of the 
highway in the lane of traffic next to the center line. 
True, the exact center of the high,vay could not be known 
by any of the eye-,vitnesses because the two center lanes 
were covered 'vith packed sno,v, as shown in defendants' 
Exhibit 7 reproduced herein. A careful reading of the 
testimony of all eye-'vitnesses, even those of respond-
ent ("~ho '\vere not eye-w,.itnesses to the collision) and 
who "~ere 'vithin a quarter of a mile of the scene of the 
accident, shows that the truck was on the west side of 
the ·center of the highway and that the left wheels, 
while close to the center, did not vary much over a foot 
either way. 
In referring to the truck at the time of the impact 
Mrs. McPhie said, ''There is to (two) lanes on the west 
side of the road. He was on tl].e east one of those two.'' 
(T-343) 
Mr. McPhie testified : 
"Q. Mr. McPhie, at the time of the impact 
do you know whether the truck was on the east 
side of the road or the center line or on the west 
side~ A. It was on the west side." (T-373-374) 
Even Beardall and Holt at a point substantially 
north of the accident were unable to say that the truck 
got any substantial distance over the center line. Beard-
all testified: 
"Q. Did you observe the position of the 
truck on the highway~ A. Yes, very much. 
That night on the road was the traveled portion 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the highway in near the center line - lane 
of the lefthand side of traffic, and we were trav-
eling where it was most worn, because that was 
the part of the highway not as slick as the rest 
of the road, and of course when the truck passed 
me it would have to be over the center lane, in 
double lane traffic.'' ( T-112) 
While counsel for respondent attempted by leading 
and suggestive questions to elicit from Holt that the 
truck went onto the east side (T. 136-7), it was clear 
on cross-examination that even when the truck passed 
the Beardall car the left wheels were not far over the 
center. Mr. Holt testified: 
'' Q. And which lane was the truck traveling 
in when it passed you~ A. Center lane, with 
the left wheels across the highway. Across the 
center line, I should say. 
'' Q. How far would you say those left 
wheels were across the center~ A. At least a 
foot at the time they passed us. 
'' Q. The center of the highway was covered 
with snow~ A. That's right." (T-141) 
It was also clear that Holt did not know either the 
position of defendants' truck or the Tuttle car when 
the collision occurred. We quote : 
"Q. Then I take it, Mr. Holt, that you, from 
your observation there that night, could not state 
what the position of the truck or the Tuttle car 
was when the impact occurred~ A. Not at the 
time of the impact, no. Just prior to that I men-
tioned where the truck was. '' ( T -141) 
Officer Halladay of the Provo City police, who was 
called to the scene of the accident, identified fresh visible 
18 
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scratch marks covering the highway from west to east. 
To illustrate the location he wrote the word "scratches" 
crossing the center line of the highway ( T -226, 227, 228), 
written in pencil on Exhibit "GG". While the word 
"scratches'' is only faintly shown on our photostat 
following page 6 of our original brief, it is more clearly 
shown on the original exhibit. Referring to these marks 
Officer Halladay said: 
''They were visible to the naked eye. I could 
see them very plain. ·Of course it was p·retty 
lighted around there at that time, but I could 
see them all right. They looked like something 
had drug along the top· of the ice there.'' 
'' Q. Could you tell us whether the marks 
had the appearance of being fresh or old marks~ 
A. They were fresh. You could tell from the 
way the ice was kicked up there. '' ( T -228) 
There was no evidence, either physical or otherwise, 
that the collision occurred on the east side of the high-
way. The sole- and only argument of respondents is 
based upon the claim that the Tuttle car would not have 
stopped at a point on the east shoulder north of the 
defendants' truck and trailer if the Tuttle car was 
travelling south as the eye-witnesses described. 
v -· 19 
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We have inserted here,vith a photostatic copy of 
defendants' Exhibit 3, 4 and 9 'vhich show the damaged 
condition of the Tuttle ear caused by the impact of the 
truck. It is rlear that the front of the truck struck the 
left side of the Plymouth practically broadside. As all 
of the eye-,vitnesses described, the truck, following the 
impact, jack-knifed, sliding over onto and along the 
east shoulder. ''Thile expert witnesses were not used 
by either party to determine the possible course or posi-
tion in 'Yhich the vehicles \Yould be likely to come to rest 
under such circumstances, logic and reason certainly 
tend to corroborate those vvho saw the ·accident occur. 
The Plymouth under such circumstance~ could tend to 
take three possible courses. If it were stationary upon 
the highway and ·struck exactly in the center with the 
weight evenly distributed, it might tend to be pushed 
continuously in front of the truck lmtil it came to rest. 
Dependent upon other and varied circumstances, it 
might be thrown or sloughed off to the side in either di-
rection, east or west, prior to the time the truck stopped. 
With the heavy p-art of the Plymouth being lodged in 
the front end carrying the _engine, and with its move-
Inent or direction of travel being towards the east, it is 
only logic to believe it would skid or slide off in that 
direction, that is easterly or rather southeasterly, by 
.. 
reason of the force of the impact. The truck, on the 
other hand, having a greater speed and momentun1 would 
naturally tend to travel a substantial distance further. 
In negotiating a turn across the highway, the phys-
ical facts show that the Plymouth at the time it was. 
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struck was substantially across defendants' lane of traf-
fic. The first point of impact would be toward the rear 
end of the Plymouth' unless it, the Plymouth, could have 
reached a position directly diagonal and at right ·angles 
with the highway. This initial impact being toward 
the rear of the Tuttle car would tend to turn it and 
slide it off. 
TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Nor could the direction of deceased's travel be 
determined by speculating as to the time Tuttle left 
Springville. Before the case was tried, plaintiffs had 
the benefit, through deposition and interrogatories, of 
the approximate time of the accident as registered 
by the truck tachometer, 8 :36 P.M. If Tuttle left 
Springville at around 8 :30 as testified to by Mrs. 
Tuttle, of course, it is possible he might have reached 
the scene of the accident on his way to Provo. How-
ever, clocks and watches are not all accurately set as 
to time nor do they always keep or record accurate 
time: Certainly, this bit of SELF-SERVING TESTI-
MONY is insufficient to fix or determine or prove 
the direction of travel a.t the scene of the accident as 
against the testimony of disinterested eye witnesses 
who observed to the contrary. 
No one was expecting the accident to occur and 
others, though close friends and relatives, did not 
claim to know the exact time. Mrs. Tuttle and her 
mother, Mrs. Jensen, were expecting to attend an 
M-Men basketball game in Springville. The first game 
commenced at 7:00 P.M. (T-154, 178). They were in-
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tending to see the second game commencing when the 
first ended, presumably at 8:00 P.M. (T-154), while 
they said the game in which they were interested had 
started \Yhen they arriYed (T-180-1), they did not say 
ho\Y long it had been going. While it wa.s mentioned 
that Tnttle "~as going to howl (T-153), no one knew 
anything about the details as to the bowling arrange-
ments. Tuttle hadn't bo,vled before and no one was 
able to give names of any of the fellows with whom 
he intended to bow·l nor the place or location thereof. 
It \vas a Saturday night (T-161-62). They were just 
figuring on forming a league (T-181). What was ac-
tually in Tuttle's mind and just where he went or 
intended to go or do could only be a matter of spec-
ulation. 
RESPONDENTS' AUTH·ORITIES 
The authorities relied upon by respondents were 
decided upon the basis of the particular facts ~and 
circumstances existing in those cases. The legal rules 
and principles therein discussed should, of course, be 
judiciously and not abstractly applied, having due 
regard first and foremost to the end that the case 
should be decided upon the basis of fact as distin-
guished from speculation or inference based upon 
inference. Probative facts from which the casual re-
lation is proven or reasonably inferred must be estab-
lished to satisfy the burden of proof. Mere specula-
tion should not be allowed to serve the duty of proba-
tive facts. 
There is a very fundament·al and distinguishing 
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difference in the cases recited by the respondents from 
the instant case in that in the instant case there were 
disinterested as well as interested witnesses in the 
immediate vicinity of the accident who observed and 
saw the accident occur, which evidence is corroborated 
by the physical evidence. 
Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co.; 59 Utah 1, 201 
P 405, page 15 respondents' brief, was an action 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
There were no eye witnesses to establish deceased's con-
tributory negligence as in the instant case. lTnder the 
circumstances, it was held that plaintiff was entitled 
to the benefit of the rule given in the court's instruc-
tion that "there is a presumption that the deceased, 
A.C.P., used due care in and about his work." The court 
then pointed out that assuming plajntiff 'vas in the 
exercise of due care, then there was evidence the ac-
cident could not have occurred except for the negli-
gence of the defendant. While indulging in the pre-
sumption, ho,vever, the court made it clear that had 
there been eye witnesses as to ho'v the accident oc-
curred, plaintiff would not have been entitled to the 
in~truction given. Said the Court: 
''The instruction is applicable only in the 
absence of evidence as to just how the accident 
happened. There was no eyewitnesses. It is only 
in such cases that litigants are entitled to this or 
a like instruction. '' 
Under the court's instructions in the instant case, 
we have pointed out the error and misleading manner 
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in 'Yhich the court permitted the jury to indulge in 
such a presun1ption. 
C'oray r. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Company, 
111 Utah 5-!1, 180 P (2) 542, page 15 of respondents' 
brief, is like,Yise brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability ..... -\.ct. Here again there were no eye witnesses 
who observed how the accident occurred and the pre-
sumption of due care on the part of deceased is only 
presumed by reason of the lack of such evidence. 
Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 101, 
48 P (2) 449, page 15 respondents' brief, was an in-
dustrial case involving a hernia. Claimant was the 
sole \Yitness and there \Vere no disinterested witnesses 
as to the fact in issue. 
The general rules quoted from Jensen v. Logan 
City, 96 Utah 522,_ 88 P(2) 459; Hearstrich v. Oregon 
Short Line R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P 100; and 
Leavitt v. Thu.rston, 38 Utah 351, 113 P 77; pages 15 
and 16 _respectively·, respondents' brief, should logic-
ally be invoked in favor of the contentions of appel-
lants, because the testimony of all eye witnesses, cor-
roborated by the physical· facts, should not be dis-
regarded, especially when plaintiffs' theory is based 
upon supposition and purely negative testimony. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED 
Defendants' motion for ~ directed verdict (T-4·54) 
was based essentially upon.\ the fact that all of the 
probative evidence showed that deceased's own negli-
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gence was. a proximate cause of the collision and plain-
tiffs failed to affirmatively prove any facts consti-
tuting a cause of action, and any verdict in favor of 
plaintiffs would necessarily rest upon speculation and 
conjecture. Such motion, made at the conclusion of all 
of the evidence, was renewed on all grounds at the 
time of filing defendants' motion for a new trial 
(T-254) filed May 25, 1950. 
When there are disinterested eye witnesses who 
saw how the accident occurred and when there are 
physical facts corroborating such eye witnesses -and 
when plaintiffs have failed to prove any affirmative 
facts giving rise to a cause of action, a verdict should 
be directed in favor of the defendants. There is then 
no reason to speculate that one of the cars was going 
in the opposite direction to which it was seen to have 
been going and further add inference upon inference 
to build an imaginary accident. Such negative evi-
dence is not sufficient to p-rove affirmative £acts as 
against the undisputed testimony of disinterested ·wit-
nesses corroborated by physical facts. 
East Grouse Creek Wa.ter Co. v. Frost, 66 
Utah 587, 245 P 338. 
Anderson v. Union Pac. R'. ~Co., 76 Utah 324, 
289 p 146. 
We respectfully submit that defendants' motion 
for a directed verdict should have been sustained. 
ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiffs here .admit that if the accident occurred 
as all of the eye witnesses say it did when the Tuttle 
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ear turned left in front of the truck, then there should 
be no reroYery hera use deceased's own negligence 
·would of necessity be the proximate cause of the col-
lision. 
T1 err ill v. Harrington (Me.), 163 Atl. 266. 
Probst v. Smith Hardware Co. (La.) 141 So. 
508. 
Youngv.Cerrato (Cal) 37P (2) 1063 
Litherbury v. Kimmet (Cal.) 195 P 660 
Madron v. McCoy, et al (Idaho) 126 P(2) 566 
Dudley v. Surles (La.) 11 So. 2nd 70 
Cederlof v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P(2) 
777 
(See pages 34..:38 of our original brief) 
However, in the court below, counsel did not pro-
ceed on the theory that the direction of travel WAS 
THE SOLE AND ONLY ISSUE, but rather sub-
mitted forty-four requested instructions (see tran-
script 149-196) consisting almost entirely of AB-
STRACT PROPOSITIONS OF LAW seeking to re-
cover on ANY ONE OF THE NUMEROUS AL-
LEGED GROUNDS OF NEGLIGENCE, in nearly 
all instances without regard to the direction of travel 
and without any application to the facts and circum-
stances of the case. Many of these requested instruc-
tions were adopted by the court verbatim as requested 
simply in the abstract. They were calculated .and 
directed to mislead, confuse and prejudice the JUry, 
and defendants were effectively denied a· fair trial. 
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JURY DID· NOT DETERMINE TUTTLE CAR 
WAS TRAVELING NORTH 
The trial court below did not leave it to the 
jury to simply determine which direction the Tuttle 
car was travelling. Had respondent at the pretrial 
limited this to the sole issue and consequently had 
the trial court done so, and had this simple issue 
alone been submitted to the jury as the sole determin-
ing factor without mingling and submitting all ab-
stract allegations of negligence, a verdict in favor of 
defendants . would undoubtedly have been the result. 
No request 'vas made by plaintiffs for a special 
interrogatory or verdict determining the direction of 
travel of the Tuttle car. The jury, confused by the 
muddle of abstractions and confused notions of coun-
sel, did not so find. Respondents here for the first 
time take the position that there was only one question, 
namely the direction in which the Tuttle car was trav-
elling. If. so, that issue only should have been sub-
mitted and the utter confusion avoided. 
Nor, did the court proceed upon the theory that 
deceased was as a matter of law free from contribu-
tory negligence if the jury found he, Tuttle, was trav-
elling north. 
Plaintiffs by their requested instructions Nos. 11, 
12 and 13 (T-159-61) also 17 (T-166) requested that 
the jury be instructed that deceased, Tuttle, was free 
from negligence or contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law if he was travelling north. In denying these 
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reqnt>sts and in denying defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict on all grounds argued on the several 
grounds stated nt the close of all the evidence (Tr .. 
45±), the trial court took the position that the issue 
of contributory negligence 'Yas one for the jury, which-
eYer direction deceased 'Yas travelling. 
\\:hile the trial court did instruct the jury that 
plaintiffs clai1ned Tuttle 'Yas driving north, defend-
ants, on the other hand, claimed he was driving south. 
That is as far as the matter went, and it was never 
determined by the court nor vvas the jury instructed 
that the direction of travel was the SOLE ISSUE and 
the question of deceased's contributory negligence was 
left to the jury in either instail.ce. By instruction No. 
3 ( T -2:23), the court instructed the jury to return a 
verdict for plaintiffs if Tuttle was driving north, pro-
vided further : 
''If you further find from the evidence that 
the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for 
his own . safety and was not himself guilty of 
negligence contributing to his death." (T-223) 
As a counterpart, the court by its instruction No. 4 
(T-224), in substance instructed the jury that plain-
tiffs could not recover if Tuttle was driving south. 
provided it further found: 
''That the deceased, Dale Tuttle1 was negligent 
in suddenly turning in front of defendants' truck 
and that such negligence proximately caused or 
proximately contributed to cause the collision.'' 
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DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE 
EVIDENCE DENIED 
I-Iaving left all issues for the jury to determine 
and to assure each party a fair and impartial trial, 
it was incumbent upon the trial court to submit the 
respective theories of each party, not merely as an 
ABSTRACT PROPOSITION, but as applied to the 
particular facts of the case. 
The lower court in substantially adopting plain-
tiffs' requests, though specific and repeated exceptions 
were duly taken by appellant, nowhere instructed the 
jury respecting the specific legal duties, statutory or 
otherwise, as they applied to contributory negligence; 
that is as they applied to Tuttle's conduct under the 
facts and circumstances of the case. In other words, 
the whole matter of contributory negligence, what-
ever view the jury took of the evidence and which-
ever the direction of Tuttle's travel, was left in the 
abstract. The jury was left without any guidance or 
help from the court so they could properly apply the 
law. This, tied in with respondents' numerous and 
repetitious allegations of negligence and abstract in-
structions, enabled counsel for the respondents to com-
pletely confuse, mislead and prejudice the jury. 
Respondents' procedure of injecting numerous al-
legations of negligence and an unreasonable number 
of purely abstract instructions not only effectively con-
fused the jury but was undoubtedly an influencin~ 
factor in causing the trial court to adopt respondents' 
requests, effectively resulting in a denial of practically 
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all of defendants' requested instructions bearing upon 
the negligence of deeea.sed, defining his duties and 
obligations as such related to the traffic and condi-
tions existing upon the high,Yay. We fail to appre-
ciate the justice in such procedure. 
Because of the confused state of the record and 
the likelihood of the jury misunderstanding the appli-
cation of lR\Y under the particular circumstances, the 
language of this court in Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 
151, 140 P(2) 7'72, quoted at the top of page 57 of 
our original brief, is especially pertinent. There it 
is clearly pointed out that each party is entitled to 
have his case submitted to the jury on any theory 
justified by proper evidence, and the giving of gen-
eral instructions is condemned. · 
Defendants' requested instructions Nos. 5 {T-202), 
8 (T-205), 9 (T-206), 10 (T-207) and 11 {T208) dis-
cussed page 54-60 our original brief, related to the law 
of contributory negligence and correctly defined cer-
tain statutory and common law duties of the deceased, 
Tuttle, in relation to other traffic. In failing to give 
any of such requests or similar instructions, the de-
fendants were denied a substantial right, the right 
to have the jury instructed on defendants' theory of 
the case. 
Without the benefit of these or similar instructions, 
the jury was so confused with the numerous repeated 
allegations and abstract ins~ructions that they h:a.d no 
idea as to 'vhat laws were involved or how they should 
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be applied concerning the rights and correlative duties 
of the respective parties or the law of the particular 
case as applied to particular facts and circumstances. 
PROCEDURE AND ERRORS CALCULATED 
TO DO HARM 
Res·pondents, while acknowledging that there were 
errors in the court's instructions and that they were 
given essentially in the abstract, argue, however, that 
such errors were not prejudicial within the rule stated 
in Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P 
349, quoted page 32 respondents' brief, as follows: 
''We think the better rule is that not all com-
mitted errors in the trial of a case are presump-
tively or prima facie prejudicial for some com-
mitted errors are merely abstract, or on their 
face immaterial or otherwise are not in and of 
themselves calculated to do harm.'' 
However, counsel omitted the rest of the language 
of the court which continuing reads: 
"However where the committed error is of 
such nature or character as calculated to do harm, 
or on its face as having the natural tendency to 
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the 
record it is affirmatively shown that the er.ror 
was not or could not have been of harmful effect. 
Thus, if the appellant shows committed· error of 
such nature or character, he, in the first instance, 
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. 
The burden, or rather the duty of going forward, 
is then cast on the respondent to show by the 
record that the committed error w·a.s not, or could 
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not have been, of harmful effect. State v. Cluff, 
48 lT tah 102, 158 P 701; Jackson, Stone, et al v. 
Feather River & Gibsonville Water Co., 14 Cal. 
19; Thelin Y. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 861 ; 2 
Hayne, Ne'Y Trial and Appeal (2d Ed.) pp. 
1608-1614. '' 
To the same effect, see Clark v. Los Angeles and 
S.L.R. Co., 73 lTtah 486, 275 P 582, at p~age 502 of the 
Utah Report. 
PROCEDURE CALClTI~_A_TED TO PREJUDICE 
The procedure pursued by counsel for respondents 
and its influencing effect upon the manner in which 
the court below instructed the jury, shows a deliberate 
plan and purpose to confuse and which was well cal-
culated to do harm, and in ·fact did have a natural 
tendency to do so. Flagrant ~rrors in the court's in-
structions, induced through counsel's procedure which 
placed greater duties on defendants than the law re-
quires, are further proof that they were calculated to 
do harm. 
We have called attention to the fact that matters 
relating to the control and speed were unreasonably 
repeated in plaintiffs' complaint, there being at least 
five sub-paragraphs, (a), (b), (e), (h), and (j), which 
were duplicitas in the extreme and were repeated ver-
batim in the court's instruction No. 1 (T-219-21). That 
the palpable and flagrant errors committed in the 
court's instruction No. 15 were intentionally done at 
the insistence of respondents is evident when refer-
ence is made to plaintiffs requested instructions Nos. 
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22 (T~l71), 28 (T-178) and 29 (T-179), all of which 
related to precisely the same matters and all of which 
INCORRECTLY QUOTED THE STATUTE, Section 
57-7-113, U.C.A. 1943, by requiring:_ such speed as to 
prevent ''COLLIDING WITH ANY PERSON, VE-
HICLE OR CONVEYANCE ON OR ENTERING 
THE HIGHWAY." The court's instruction No. 15 
was apparently taken verbatim from plaintiffs' re-
quested instruction No. 29. 
Instructing the jury in such manner was especi-
ally unfair to defendants when the court entirely re-
jected defendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 and 
17 ( T -213-4). These requests, discussed pages 49 and 
50 our original brief, or similar qualifying instructions, 
would have at least limited the jury to claims of negli-
gence based upon ''speed'' or ''being over the center 
line of the highway'' to circumstances where such 
might reasonably found to be A PROXIl\IATE CAUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. In other words, there was no 
application of the abstract instructions given as to the 
particular facts and circumstances, and counsel for 
respondents was permitted to confuse and mislead the 
jury as to proximate cause and to cause them to be-
lieve that if defendants' truck could not under the cir-
cumstances avoid a collision or if defendants' driver 
was going. one mile per hour over the regulated speed 
limit or the left wheels of defendants' truck were any 
degree over the center line, then defendants were liable. 
These matters were emphasized beyond all reason, 
HAVING BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CASE AT 
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THE CONTINUED INSISTENCE OF COUNSEL 
FOR RESPONDENTS BY HIS NUMEROUS AND 
REPETITIOUS ALLEGATIONS AND REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIO~S AND WERE CLEARLY CALCU-
L_._\TED TO INFLUENCE AND MISLEAD THE 
JlTRY. Clearly, a greater duty was placed upon the 
defendants than required under the statute. 
The harm in giving such instructions (primarily 
relating to speed) is further evident in the fact that 
such instructions could only be applied and effectually 
argued as against the defendants. There was no claim 
of speed on the part of the deceased, Tuttle, he having 
made an improper turn. (See defendants' ansvver -
T-23-4) Such instructions were calculated to harm 
defendants and were effectively used with undue em-
phasis on matters not shown to have been a proximate. 
or actual cause of the collision. 
ERROR CALCULATED TO PREJUDICE 
The court's instruction No. 15 was particularly 
vicious in that it left out the important and qualifying 
portions of the statute, Section 57-7-113, and required 
defendants' driver unqualifiedly to drive at such speed 
that he could ''A VOID COLLIDING WITH ANY 
PERSON, VEHICLE OR OTHER CONVEYANCE 
ON OR ENTERING THE HIGHWAY.' This clearly 
cast upon defendants a duty that is greater than is 
required not only under the statute but und~r rule of 
law generally. 
In Knutson v. Luri, (Iowa) 251 N.W. 147, an 
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instruction much like that in the instant case was held 
to erroneously define the duty of defendant and was 
reversible error. The instruction first stated in general 
terms that it was the duty of the defendant to exer-
cise ordinary care, but added that if there was danger 
of collision, ''it is his duty to reduce the speed of his 
car so * * * he can bring his vehicle to a stop and 
avoid injury.'' The court s·aid that this instruction 
was erroneous because it required her to avoid injury 
''whether a reasonable prudent person could do so or 
not. * * * Obviously the instruction, even when read 
with the remainder of the court's charge was preju-
dicial.'' 
In Loony v. Parker (Iowa) 230 N.W. 570, an in-
struction requiring the defendant ''to maintain such 
control of his car as to enable him to stop without hit-
ting the car ahead of him'' was erroneous as requir-
ing the driver to exercise such control as to ''avoid 
collision whether he was negligent or not.'' 
In Gregory v. Suhr (Iowa) 268 N.W. 14, a new 
trial was properly g:r.anted where an instruction had 
been given which tended to impose upon the defend-
ant the absolute duty of having his automobile under 
such control as to avoid a collision. See also Fry v. 
Smith, (Iowa) 253 N.W. 147. 
In Boutelle v. White (Ga.) 149 S.E. 805, an in-
struction among other things requiring defendant to 
exercise ' 'the degree of diligence * * * necessary to 
avoid injuring others'' was properly refused as im-
posing the duty of an insurer. And in Giles v. 17 oiles 
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(Ga.} S~ ~.E. ~07, the giYing of an instruction contain-
ing the ~nlnP language as in the Boutelle case 'vas held 
:·eyersible Prror, the court saying: 
-·This iinposed on defendant the duty of ob-
serYing the diligence required of ~an insurer and 
eliminated all such questions as accident, con-
tributory negligence, and the duty of plaintiff 
to exereise ordinar~~ rare to avoid the conse-
quences of defendant's negligence." 
In Grandha.gen r. Grnndhagen (Wis.) 225 N.W. 
935, it 'Yas reYersible error to instruct the jury "that 
it i=' tl1e ~lut:· nf e\·._.ry clri,·pr nf a rnotor ear upon 
tht-> high\\·a~- tu kePp hi:' auturuubile at al1 times under 
L:uutrul. and ir he fail~ to have his car under control he 
is guilty of 'Yant of ordinary care." The court said 
that this ''imposed an undue burden upon the defend-
andt. The duty of Oscar Grandhagen was to exercise 
ordinary care to keep his automobile under control. 
The instruction imposed the absolute duty to keep the 
automobile under control at all times, regardless of 
the question of whether ordinary care was exercised in 
so doing." 
See also Saltas v. Affleck, -99 Utah .381, 105 P(2) 
176, discussed page 47 our original brief. 
The court's instruction No. 14 (T-234), set forth 
page 46 of appellants' original brief, was similarly 
calculated to cause the jury to believe that defendant 
\vas required to ''avoid a collision with another vehicle 
or person upon the highway reasonably ·within the 
range of his vision.'' 
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While the court did modify respondents' original 
requested instruction No. 28 by requiring defendant 
to take such measures as are "reasonable'', it still in 
substance and effect led the jury to believe that under 
the law defendant was required absolutely to avoid a 
collision. The clear and palpable error in the court's 
instruction No. 15 was thereby re-emphasized. 
It cannot be claimed that other instructions cured 
the error because conflicting instructions, or instruc-
tions which are misleading or have a natural tendency 
to mislead, are presumed to have had an influencing 
effect upon the jury. 
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 261, 170 P. 72; 
State v. Green, (Utah) 6 P. (2d) 177; 
Martin v. ·sheffield, (Utah) 189 P. (2d) 127; 
Saltas v. Affleck, supr·a. 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The court's instruction No. 13 ( T -233) given ver-
ba tim fron1 respondents' reuested instruction No. 27 
(T-176) also viciously imposed upon the defendants' 
driver a duty far greater than the la\v requires. It 
was \Veil calculated to injure defendants and arouse 
prejudice in the minds of the jury. It arbitrarily re-
quired that defendant be extraordinarily alert "BY 
C,ONSTANTLY keeping A LOOKOUT NOT ONLY 
AHEAD BUT TO THE SIDES OF HIS VEHICLE.'' 
Yet, there was not even any evidence that defendants' 
driver failed to keep a lookout. He at all times s;aw 
the Tutle car and was observing the highway ahead 
of him. Even if there had been evidence as to lack 
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of lookout, still the instruction 'vas erroneous and pre-
judicial in requiring a greater lookout than the law 
imposed. The instruction also brought in facts not even 
inYolYed in the case, such as intersections. It IM-
POSED LI.J..L\.BILITY upon defendant if he did not 
"CONST.A.NTLY KEEP A LOOKOUT NOT ONLY 
~L\HE.:\.D B1JT TO THE SIDES OF HIS VEHICLE". 
It 'vas qualified only by the limitation of contributory 
negligence stated in general terms not adequately cov-
ered in other fustructions. 
ERROR IN SUBniiTTING ALL ALLEGATIONS 
· Certainly the large number of respondents' re-
uested instructions 'vas an influencing factor in caus-
ing the court to give its instruction No. 1 ( T -219-2~) 
covering all of the naked allegations vvithout regard 
to supporting evidence or proximate cause. .In this 
respect we note that requests numbered 2 (T-151), 3 
(T-154), 8 (T-157) 16 (T-165) and 33 (T-183) all called 
for a submission of each and every allegation of negli-
gence, which were themselves duplitious and in no wise 
connected up with the proximate cause of the collision. 
OVER-EJVIPHASIS AS TO DEFENDANTS' 
SPEED, ETC. 
Respondents especially made it a point from the 
beginning to place such undue emphasis upon speed, 
control, presumptions, circumstantial evidence and 
other vague and abstract principles clearly calculated 
to confuse. In ddition to his requested instructions 
numbered 11, 12 and 13 relating to speed and control, 
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requests numbered 20 (T-169), 22 (T-171), 23 (T-172), 
24 (T-173), 29 (T-179) and 37 (T-187) related to sim-
ilar matter. 
LIGHTS 
There was no evidence that the lights on defend-
ants' truck were blinding or that flashing lights on and 
off interfered with the vision of deceased, as alleged 
in paragraph (k) incorporated in the court's instruc-
tion No. 1 ( T -219-21). True, the driver flashed his 
lights from low to high beam and back to low beam 
again ( T -2.61) as a signal to the cars :ahead of him 
which he was passing ox intending to pass and which 
were travelling in the same direction in the righthand 
lane of traffic. Such practice is such a well-established 
one, used designedly for the purpose of signalling an 
intention to pass, that it is not necessary to convince 
this court of such practice. There is no evidence, how-
ever, and it would be pure speculation to assume, that 
such lights interfered with the vision of deceased, or to 
assume from the mere fact that he did blink his lights 
that deceased was blinded or that such had any casual 
connection with the collision. Clearly respondents in-
jected this matter, as they did the other numerous 
allegations, for the purpose of misleading the jury and 
causing them to feel prejudiced against defendants. 
By making this and building up other hypothetical 
contentions they piled inference upon inference to 
utter confusion. 
ERROR AS TO PRESUMPTION 
We pointed out, page 51 of our original brief, 
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that the court's instruction No. 6 (T-226) in effect 
permitted the jury to assume that deceased was pre-
snnled to be in the exerrise of reasonable care. Such 
rule, ho,Yever, has no application where there is proof 
to the contrary: in this instance clearly rebutted by 
disinterested eye-\Yitnesses corroborated by the phyiscal 
facts. Perrin L'. Union Pacific R. R. ,Co., 59 Utah 1, 
201 P. 405, supra. See, also, Saltas v. Affleck, In Re 
rl ewell's Estate and other authorities cited at page 40 
of appellants' original brief. 
Here, again, the matter of presumption was 
asked for by at least three of plaintiffs' requests, 
namely, Nos. 5 (T-154), 12 (T-161) and 13 (T-162). 
On the other hand defendants' requested instruction 
No. 19 (T-216), \Yhich would have correctly instructed 
the jury on the matter, 'vas refused over defendants' 
specific exceptions. 
OVER-EMPHASIS AS. TO INFERENCES 
AND PRESUMPTIONS 
The court's instruction No. 9 ( T -229), added to 
the numerous other abstract and misleading instruc-
tions, permitted the jury to think that they could 
judge the case on general principles without applica-
tion of particular laws and particular circumstances. 
This, again, caused the jury to lose sight of :a.nd com-
pletely disregard the matter of proximate caus~. This 
type of instruction was induced by respondents' re-
uested instructions numbered 14 (T-163), 34 (T-184) 
and 35 (T-185). We ask, how could the numerous and 
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irrelevant allegations and abstract instructions help 
but influence and mislead the jury~ 
SUDDEN EMERGENCY MISAPPLIED 
As a result of plaintiffs' requested instructions 
numbered 6 (T-154) and 18 (T-167) the court gave an 
abstract instruction relating to sudden emergency (see 
the court's instruction 22 (T-243). This was especially 
harmful when counsel for respondents over-empha-
sized such rna tters as speed, control and driving over 
the center line, when in fact there was no proof that 
the same or other repetitious rna tters had anything to 
do with the proximate cause of the collision. There 
was no evidence that Tuttle was faced with an emer-
gency. The evidence is he created one. 
Except for the undue length of this brief we should 
point out other numerous and abstract instructions 
which tended to mislead and confuse the jury. 
INSURANCE INDEMNIFICATION 
When counsel for respondents throughout the 
trial had made continued reference to Kunz and Platt 
(the mysterious investigators) and continually re-
ferred to various statements taken, it was unnecessary 
for Carol Ellis to volunteer ''the insurance adjuster'' 
even though the first reference thereto was in re-
sponse to a question asked by the defense. She could 
have referred to ''Kunz" or even "the investigator". 
Certainly, it was not necessary for her to later, when 
questioned by plaintiffs' counsel, to again bring in 
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the matter by Ynlunteering the statement "he said 
he '\Yas from the INSURANCE COMPANY''. 
Through rautioning ~liss Ellis, a regular client of 
counsel for respondents, counsel could easily have 
aYoided such reference. 
CONCLUSION 
For lack of eYidence, it appears counsel for re-
spondents from the outset substituted multiple allega-
tions of negligent and llll_merous and duplicitas abstract 
instructions of la \Y calcnla ted to mislead and confuse 
the jury. Such procedure, coupled with wholly nega-
tive testimony produced through friendly witnesses 
naturally sympathetic to deceased's family, should not 
in justice be substituted for proven facts based upon 
the unbiased testimony of disinterested eye witnesses 
corroborated by tangible physical facts. 
Respondents suggestion that the case has been 
twice tried is a further play upon the sympathy of 
this court, while the record on the other hand shows 
a determined effort from the beginning on the part of 
respondents to confuse, mislead and prejudice the jury, 
as a result of which a verdict was finally obtained. 
We respectfully submit that such verdict should be 
set aside, the judgment reversed and an order made 
directing judgment for the defendant in accordance 
with the facts of the accident. 
If for any reason this court does not agree, al-
though we feel certain it will, then that a new trial be 
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ordered with proper issues and instructions so de- . . 
fined as to assure a fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON, 
E. F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Pefendants 
and AppellcvntJs. 
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